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ABSTRACT
Inthis paper weprovide additional evidence thatprocessconsistency
mayhavematerialized as a restrictive constraint on the money generation
process. In addition to recomputing the time series of process consist-
ency probabilities using new data from the German case, we also supply
our empirical technique to the data from the other hyperinflations
studied by Cagan. We interpret our results as evidence hearing on the
type of transversality condition studied by Brock or by Brock and
Scheinkmanas a sufficient condition to insure a uniqueequilibrium in
optimizingmodels with perfect foresight and money.
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This century's post-war hyperinflations have displayed rates of price
and money supply increase which have isolated them almost as a separate area
of monetary theory and experience. Economic researchers have treated
hyperinflations primarily as intense monetary experiments, remarkable
opportunities to test basic monetary and expectational theories in environments
devoid of confounding real movements.1
In Flood and Garber (1980a) we devised a model which employed the
concept of process consistency, the requirement that a money supply process
generate a finite price level, to examine the transition from extreme
hyperinflation to monetary reform. Our empirical results, based on the
German case, provided evidence in favor of the model, in that the reform
occurred at the moment that the probability of process consistency reached
its lowest value. Our study can be interpreted, in line with the usual
treatmient of hyperinflation, as yet another test of abstruse monetary
theory provided by the extreme of the hyperinflationary wind-tunnel.2'3
In this paper we provide additional evidence that process consistency
may have materialized as a restrictive constraint on the money generation
process. In addition to recomputing the time series of process consistency
probabilities using new data for the German case, we also apply our empirical
technique to the data from the other hyperinflations studied by Cagan (1956).
In the most extreme cases, Hungary II, Germany and Greece, we find that, as
in our earlier study, the probability of process consistency reached its
lowest value at the initiation of the reform.
We divide the paper into two sections. Section I is designed simply
as a research report on our new results. Section II is a speculation-3—
concerning how the results can be interpreted as evidence about some of
the more esoteric questions that have arisen recently in monetary theory.
In particular, we interpret our results as evidence bearing on atransversality
condition studied: by Brock (1974) and by Brock and Scheinkman (1980)as a
sufficient condition to insure a unique equilibrium in optimizing models
with perfect foresight and money.
Since transversality conditions imply that no money supply process
can be inconsistent, they also imply that computations of process consistency
should be related to monetary reform only by coincidence. That such a
coincidence should be present in the most extreme hyperinflations is hard
to ignore. Thus, in section lIb we discuss monetary reform in terms of
the political climate prevailing at the ends of the big hyperinflations.-4-
I. Empirical Results
In this section we report our constructed time series for process
consistency probabilities in a number of hyperinflations. The assumptions
and theory behind these computations are those employed in Flood and Garber
(1980a). In particular, we assume that the forms of the money demand
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thevriables m,m1, and p are the logarithms of money demand,themoney
stock and the price level, respectively; E is the mathematical expecations
operator; and is an information set which contains all relevant economic
data through time t— 1, together with the money demand pàrameters.'1 and
are random disturbances and y a2, a2 and e are parameters. Agents
do not know the parameters of money supply; they form beliefs about 8 and a2
by means of Bayesian posterior probability density functions.Application of standard methods for the solution of difference





If the money supply is expected to grow rapidly enough relative to
the money demand parameter embodied in 'I', the expected (and actual) price
solution will be infinite. In such a case, no agent will exchange goods
for currency; hence, the supply process will not provide a useful money.
We classify any money supply process which yields a finite price
level solution as process consistent. Equivalently, any supply process
which yields an infinite expected price solution is called process
inconsistent. If an economy is to continue functioning as a monetary
economy, agents must believe that any supply process which they perceive
as process inconsistentwill be overthrown in favor of a process consistent
money supply process. Therefore, if there were little likelihood that a
supply process is consistent, we would expect a monetary reform.
Since agents are unsure about the values of the parameters of the
money supply process is process consistent. However, there is a region
2 . of(,cr )valuesfor which the supply process is process consistent;
therefore, the probability of process consistency at any time can be
determined by integrating the posterior probability density function for
(®2) over the appropriate region.
Specifically, the construction of the probability of process
consistency is an exercise in the integration of the posterior p.d.f.:-.5-
T
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With the money supply data from the
various hyperinflations ad estimates for ,wecan compute the posterior
probabilities of process consistency. To insure convergence of the numerical
integration we have altered our previous integration technique somewhat;
in the appendix we explicitly describe our new method.
a) An Overview of the Hyperinflations
The seven instances which form the basis of most hyperinflation studies
encompass a wide range of inflationary intensity. Table I (which is
constructed from Cagan's (1956) Table 1, p. 26) arranges the various episodes
by the magnitude of price level change experienced during the course of
the inflation.
The first three hyperinflations in Table 1 can be categorized as
particularly extreme inflationary episodes; the last three were relatively
mild; and the Russian case lies somewhere between the other two groups. In
studying the extreme hyperinflations, Cagan (1956) was forced to exclude
observations from the final months of each episode because he observed far
more real balances than predicted by money demand relationships estimated
from earlier observations. Following Cagan, others who have studied these—6—
inflations have also excluded those months in which prices rose most
rapidly. Of the other inflatioris, only the Polish case required a similar
exclusion of observations; Cagan deleted the final two months of Polish data.
For all the hyperinflations except the Greek case, the time of the
reform is defined as the time at which the price level or exchange rate
stabilized; in these cases, a new money supply process
In the Greek case, the government announced a monetary
1944; the reform proved abortive in that the inflation
continued, but since we pinpoint this time as a switch
process, it is a possible candidate for the time of reform.
b) The GermanCase
In our earlier examination of the German case, we employed a timeseries
on money which, partly due to the availability of data, combined monthly
observations from the inflation's first years with weekly observations from
the last year. In addition, the money supply data from the last weeks of
the German inflation included the newly introduced "fixed value" currencies,
converted into nominal units by a market exchange rate.
We have recomputed the process consistency probabilities for Germany
a
withtwodifferent alterations in our data series. First, we have constructed
a purely weekly time series by combining the weekly Reichsbankn'ote series
for 1919—1922 reported in Flood and Garber (l980b) with the weekly series
for 1923 used in our (l980a) study.6 Therefore, any statistical problems
which may arise through the combination of weekly and monthly series are





in a money supply—7--
Reichsbanknotes; the fixed value monies which appeared in the final weeks
are ignored.7
In Table II, we report the series for the probability of process
consistency for each money aggregate. The two money series are identical
until September 15, 1923, when nominal railroad money began to appear;
upon its appearance at the end of October, 1923, fixed value money was
included with nominal currency to form the series for all monies. The
date of the first observation on Reichsbanknotes is December 23, 1918. The
a ued to compute,log i,U was Cagan's estimate, a =— 5.46months, converted
to weekly time units. The rates of growth of the logarithms of the money
supply (the 's) were the rate per week.
In the last weeks of thehyperinflation,our original series and
the two new series exhibit similar patterns of movement in theprocess
consistency probabilities. The three cycles beginning on August 15, 1923
appear for all three money aggregates. For the original money series and
for the all—inclusive weekly series, the probability ofprocess consistency
reaches its lowest value on November 15, 1923, the week in which the
reform began. For the Reichsbanknote series, the lowest probability is
reached on August 31; however, the probability of process consistency for
this money series does reach a relatively low value on November 15. The
major change observable in our new results is that the probability of
process consistency is almostunityprior to August15,1923. Ourearlier
computaciorts indicated that the probability of process consistency moved
between .46 and .58 prior to August 15. The results for the weekly series
indicate that agents could be fairly confident in their money's process
consistency prior to August, 1923.8—8--
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Pe=pricelevel at end of period
Poprice level at beginning of period
Source: Cagan, Table I—9—
Table II
Probabilities of Process Consistency —Germany(weekly data)
Probability— Probability— Probability— Probability— Includes Only Includes Only Date Fixed Value Money Reichsbanknotes Date Fixed Value Money Reichsbanknotes
1923
May 15 .9999 .9999 Nov 7 .0538 .6480
May 23 .9999 .9999 Nov 15 .0258 .1828
May 31 .9999 .9999 Nov 23 .8922 .8482
June 7 .9999 .9999 Nov 30 .9664 .9888
June 15 .9999 .9999 Dec.7 .9940 .9942
June 23 .9999 .9999 Dec 15 .9953 .9972
June 30 .9999 .9999 Dec 22 .9955 .9972
July 7 .9997 .9997 Dec 31 .9956 .997Z
1924
July 14 .9999 .9999 Jan 7 .9957 .9974
July 23 .9999 .9999 Jan 15 .9958 —
July31 .9999 .9999 Jan 23 .9959
Aug 7 .9993 .9993 Jan 31 .9960
Aug 15 .9998 .9998 Feb 7 .9961
Aug 23 .7635 .7635 Feb 15 .9961
Aug 31 .0655 .0655 Feb 23 .9962
Sept 7 .1323 .1323 Feb 29 .9963
Sept 15 .9659 .9783 March 7 .9964
Sept 22 .5143 .5662 March 15 .9965
Sept 29 .5367 .6454 March 22 .9965
Oct 6 .2621 .3346 March 31 .9966
Oct 15 .9949 .9969 April 7 .9967
Oct 23 .9564 .9696
Oct 31 .4378 .7112-10-
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In Figure 1, we reproduce Figure 4 fromour previous (l980a) paper;
this is simply a diagram of themovement through time of the process
consistency probabilities based on the originalmoney series. Superimposed
(dashed lines) on Figure 1 is theprobability time series computed from
the all—inclusive weeklymoney data. While the timing of the cycles are =
thesame in both cases, the cycles for the allweekly data exhibit a
substantially higher amplitude, Observation 92 coincideswith November 15, 1923.
c) The Greek Case
We computed the probabilities ofprocess consistency for the Greek
inflation from January, 1943 throughAugust, 1946. Data are available at
monthly intervals and we used the end of monthmoney series, reported in
Cleveland and Delive.njs (1948). For thefirst money supply observation
we selected July, 1941, the beginning of theNazi occupation.
An attempt at monetary reform occurredon Novnber 11, 1944; but this
reform is generally considered to have beenabortive since it was followed
by nearly two more years ofmoney stock and price increases. A data problem
coincides with this reform attempt because themoney stock is reported
as of November 11, 1944, rather thanas of November 30. Thus, we were
forced to interpolate to derivea November 30 observation. We tried to
different methods to produce a continuoustime series of money observations.
tn the first method (Series I)a linear interpolation in the double
logarjth of the money supply was performedon the November 11 and
December 31 observations to yieldon observation for November 30. In the
second method (Series II) theaverage monthly were computed fronthe
observations on October 31 and November 11and from the observations on—12—
November11 and December 31; this method is essentially the same as
that used in our original German series in that observations taken at
varying time intervals are connected in a time series.
We report process consistency probabilities for both series in
Table III; of course, the two series are identical prior to November 11, 1944.
The ,usedto derive logis that reported by Cagan, a.- 4.09months.
The process consistency probability for the drachma fluctuates
between .55and.79 from January, 1943 through April, 1944. Starting in
June, 1944 it declines steadily, reaching a value near zero by November 30,
the moment the reform started. By January, 1945, the probability of
process consistency reaches .84, the highest value to date,.and begins a
steady rise toward unity. Thus, the Greek case is similar to the German
caseinthatthe probability of process consistency reaches its lowest
valueat the moment of the reform. The reform did not succeed in halting
theinflation, but apparently it wassuccessful in restoring the public's
confidence in the process consistency of the drachna.
InFigure 2,we plot the probabilities of process consistency for
the SeriesI data,. Observation 5 corresponds to May, 1943; observation 22
is November, 1944.
d) The Hungary II Case
The Hungarian II case, like the German case, is complicated by the
introduction of a "fixed value" currency during the last months of the
inflation. The tax pengo was a demand deposit which was indexed to a
cost-of-living price index, although its units were always measured in
terms of the nominal pengo. Introduced in Jauuary,. 1946, it maintained—13—
Table III
Probabilities of Process Consistency —Greece
Probability— Probability— Probability— Probability—
Date Series I Series II Date Series I Series II
January, 1943 .722 .722 November .937 x 1O .936 x lO
February .771 .771 December .498 .921 x i08
March .779 .779 January, 1945 .845 .911
April .748 .748 February .859 .916
May .714 .714 March .887 .929
June .793 .793 April .893 .933
July .780 .780 May .895 .935
August .732 .732 June .901 .939
September .732 .732 July .904 .941
October .730 .730 August .908 .944
November .634 .634 September .910 .946
December .644 .644 October .913 .949
January, 1944 .583 .583 November .916 .951
February .741 .741 December .919 .952
March .710 .710 January, 1946 .921 .954
April .555 .555 February .923 .956
May .149 .149 March .924 .957
June .506 .506 April .928 .959
July .463 .463 May .930 .961
August .383 .383 June .933 .962
September .044 .044 July .935 .964




Probabilities of Process Consistency
Greece
S aO 3v vo—15--
its real value until May. The inflation then became so rapid that the
indexation, based on the price index on the day prior to withdrawal, was
not sufficient to maintain its real value; and the tax pengo also depreciated
rapidly in real terms. Thus, the "fixed value" money became a nominal
money in the last months of the inflation. See Nogaro (1948) for a detailed
discussion of this inflation.9
To account for this difficulty, we again employed two time series
for money. The first (Series I) is a series of nominal money only, which,
prior to January, 1946, is the sum of paper pengos and demand deposits.
From January, 1946 onward, the demand deposits were indexed, so from that
date Series I consists only of paper pengos. The second series (Series iI)..
consists of paper pengos plus the nominal value of tax pengos throughout
the hyperinflation. Series II seems to be the preferable series, since
by the end of July, 1946, the ratio of the nominal value of deposits to
the nominal value of notes was on the order of magnitude of 1010, i.e.
notes had ceased to be money.. With the reform on August 1, 1946, a new
currency, the forint was introduced, and the ratio of notes to deposits
resumed its pre—tax pengo value, approximately six to one.
In Table IV, we report the money supply figures for the Hungarian II
case so that the reader may obtain an. idea of the magnitudes involved. The
data are the end of month figures. We begin our first money stock observation
in June, 1945.10 Starting in August, 1946, the forint was introduced; it
was exchanged with the pengo at a rate of 400 octillion (1027) pengo/forint.
We have converted all money totals to pengos.
In Table V we report our computed probabilities of process consistency
for both data series. The used to compute log is Cagan's, -3.63


















bruary11.1 — December 9.68x106 2.80xl02612.48x1026
arch 11.1 — Jan, 1947J.O..1,7xl0263.05x102613.22xl026
)ril 11.6 February ..L11..3xl0263.56xl02614.47x1026
ay 12.1 — March •-LL3xi0264.04x1026l5.77x1026
me 14.5 3.2 17.2 April 12.58x10264.48x1026l7.06x1026
aly 16.3 3.9 20.2 May l4.08x10264.89x102618.97x1026
gust 24.4 4.7 29.1 June l4.68x10265.l5x102619.83x1026
pternber41.9 6.2 48.1
tober 110. 9.6 119.6
,vember360. 28. 338.
cember 770. 64. 834.
an, 1946 l.6x103151. l.75x103
bruary 5.2x103 1.1x103 6.3xl03
arch 3.4x104 l..2x104 4.6x104
,ril 4.3x105 3.5x105 7.8xl05
ay 6.6x107 1.1x108 1.76x108
.









+Datain forints converted to
pengo at 400 octillion (1027) Jan, 1947,No. 1; Dec.,—17—
Table V
Probabilities of Process Consistency -HungaryII
Probability Probability
Date Series I Series II
Nov, 1945 .0322 .0322
Dec. .0597 .0597



















probabilities, which then rise somewhat. This phenomenon results from our
starting our money observations in June, 1945; this means that the first
few observations, which are increasing, have a strong influence on the
posterior p.d.f,, causing it to give substantial weight to the non—convergent
region. The decline in f3. for November-December, 1945 produces the jump
in the process consistency probability. The probabilities then decline
until the reform in August, 1946; the Series IIprocess consistency
probability reaches its lowest value at the moment of the reform and then
rises steadily. We diagram this series in Figure 3; observation three
corresponds to January, 1946 while observation 10 corresponds to August, 1946.
The Series I probability reaches its lowest value in July, 1946,
rises in August, and declines again in September. This phenomenon can
be interpreted from the data in Table IV. Recalling that theprocess
consistency probability for a given observation is computed using money
data through the prior observation, we note that the ratio ofpengos in
June, 1946 to pengos in May, 1946 was an order. of magnitude greater than
the July—June ratio. The observation for July would then be lower
than that for June causing a rise in the process consistency calculation
forAugust. The decline in the probability calculation for September can
be explained by the August reform. The July, 1946money data indicate that
the pengo notes had become an insubstantial part of themoney stock by
thatdate. Thereform on August 1 restored a more normal ratio of notes
to deposits (in terms of forints); when the forints are converted topengos
in August, notapDear to have risen by a factor of iolO over July, thereby
causinga fall in the process consistency probability measured for September.








e) The Russian Case
As in the German and Hungarian II episodes, the Rassian experience is
complicated by the introduction of a fixed value currency, the chevronetz,
priorto the monetary reform. The reform can be dated around February-March,
1924;the chevrontsi started tocirculate in January, 1923. We computed
probabilitiesof process consistency both for the money series consisting
of paper rubles alone (Series I) and for the series consisting of paper
rubles plus the paper value of the chevronetz circulation (Series II). The
data for the quantities of money in circulation and the market exchange
rates are available in Katzenellenbauxa (1925).
We report the results of these computations iii Table VI. The starting
date for the money supply series was November, 1917, the beginning of the
Bolshevik revolution. Theused to compute logwas Cagan's= - 3.06
months. The computed probabilities of process consistency do not approach
the low levels reached by the more extreme inflations. The lowest level
attained was .526 in February, 1922.11 There is a fairly substantial
decline in the probabilities near the end of the inflation (to .777 for
the paper ruble series in December, 1923), but the reform occurred two or
three months later.
f) The Polish Case
To study the Polish case, we used a money supply series observed at
ten-day intervals. The monetary aggregate (central bank notes in circulation)
is the same as that usually used for this case, but the time between observations
has been one month. We obtained our data from weekly issues of Economist
published contemporaneously with the Polish inflation; starting on Augiist 31, 1922,
the money stock was regularly sampled at ten day intervals through the
inflation's end in February, 1924.—21—
Table VI
Probabilities of Process Consistency -Russia
Prob .—
paper Prob. —paper Prob. -paper Prob. -paper
-rubles-rublesand
Date rubles only rubles& chevrontsi Date only chevrontsi
April 1, 1921 .996 Feb. .947 .942
May 1 .997 March .952 .946
June 1 .997 April .961 .956
July 1 .997 May .947 .936
Aug. 1 .998 June .951 .933
Sept. 1 .995 July .968 .961.
Oct. 1 .990 Aug. .961 .941
Nov. 1 .985 Sept. .954 .898
Dec. 1 .938 Oct. .958 .827
Jan. 1, 1922 .869 Nov. .957 .782
Feb. 1 .526 Dec. .777 .865
March1 .727 Jan. 1, 1924 .920 .873
April 1 .797 Feb. .926 .850
May 1 .771 March .920 .749
June 1 .859 April .804 .793
July 1 .806 May .987 .976





Jan. 1, 1923 .960-22-
Table VII contains the probabilities of process consistency for Poland.
Once again Cagan's= - 2.30months, altered to conform to the ten day time
interval, was employed in computing log jr.The lowest process consistency
probability, .927, occurs on December 10, 1923, two months prior to the
reform.
g) The Austrian and Hungarian I Cases
For the Austrian and Hungarian I inflations, we used money supply
series observed at weekly intervals instead of the monthly series used by
other researchers. Weekly data for the Austrian crown are available in
Waires des Bordes (1924); we chose January 7, 1920 for our first observation
on the Austrian money supply. For Hungary, weekly data exists in Economist's
weekly reports on central bank balance sheets in contemporary volumes; we
selected December 31, 1921 as our first observation on the Hungarian money
stock. For Austria, the reform occurred in September, 1922; for Hungary,
the reform can be dated in February, 1924.
Cagan's a.'s, altered to account for the weekly observation period,
were employed; for Austria,= - 8.55months while for Hungary, a.= - 8.70
months. The Austrian probability of process consistency was computed for
each week in the period March 15, 1922 to December 15, 1922; for all
observations the probab{lity of process consistency is at least .9999. For
Hungary, the probabilities were computed for each week in the period
March 15, 1923 to March 31, 1924; for all but two observations, the probability
of process consistency was at least .99. For two weeks August 23 and
August 31, 1923, the probability fell to .983.—23—
Table VII
Probabilities of Process Consistency -Poland
Date Prob. Date Prob.
July 20, 1923 .989 Feb. 29 .992
July 31 .989 March 10 .990
Aug. 10 .986 March 20 .994
Aug. 20 .989 March 31 .994
Aug. 31 .989 April 10 .995
Sept. 10 .975 April 20 .996
















II.Implications for Behavior at Infinity
The time series of process consistency probabilities presented in
sectionI are a set of data which we constructed. The computation of these
numbers is based on a simple theory of money demand and supply in severe
hyperinflation; and the theory seems to derive some support from the
probabilities' attaining their lowest values at the moment of reform. This
support depends on only three observations, so to push the results into
othertheoretical domains may seem brash. However, these episodes are as
close to infinity as any observable monetary economy has ever approached.
Therefore, we propose to employ them as the only available evidence of
limiting behavior in a monetary economy.
Our results concern the movement of prices to infinity in finite
time as the rate of money creation expands; somehow process inconsistency
forces a monetary reform. However, in the context of monetary models
with explicit optimizing behavior, transversality conditions or conditions
on utility functions are imposed which prevent real balancea frota reaching
zero in finite time (or, in somecases, fromapproaching zero in the limit)
regardless of the rate of money growth. The purpose of these transversality
conditions is to force unique solutions for equilibrium price sequences,
but they are strong enough to preclude not only embarrassing multiple price
solutions but also process inconsistency.
Propositions in economics about behavior at infinity usually do not
suffer from the indignity of being confronted by evidence; in fact, our
data have a very limited scope for distinguishing the appropriateness of
the transversality conditions. However small the scope, in this section
we explore the use of our results as such evidence since other means of-25-
confronting these propositions are not readily available. First, we discuss
the natureofthe transversality conditions and briefly review the literature
in which theyappear.Next, we discuss how our results maybeused as
evidence for or against these hypotheses. We warnthereader at this point
that only the results of the Germancaseseemcapableof distinguishing
whether or not process inconsistency can occur; even in thatcase,the
distinction is not manifest.
a) Transversality Conditions
Itt simplemodelsof money demand, like that in equation 1, the
possibility of multiple, explosive price solutions arises. In developing
price solutions in such models, a transversality condition is often imposed
to yield a unique solution. For instance, Sargent and Wallace (1973, p. 331)
impose the condition
-
-(n-I) litu$ cx 0 tt÷n
insolving for the current inflation rate. Here =Ias in (4b) and
Ex is the current expectation of the inflation rate n periods from now.
tt-1-n
InFlood and Garber (1980b, p762—3) we explicitly show that this restriction
on the growth rate of anticipated inflation rates is strong enough to exclude
multiple solutions and to restrict attention to money supply proesses which
are not too explosive; money demand behavior does not preclude process
inconsistency, however.
Dissatisfied with these mechanical rules to determine money demand,
theorists in the last decade have proposed somewhat less mechanical models
to determine money demand through optimizing behavior in a dynamic framework.—26—
Brock(1974) accounted for money demand by placing real balances in the
utility function. Each period, the typical agent in Brock's model seeks
to maximize (in Brock's notation)
E 8t[()+
v(m) + b(l)] t=l
subject to a budget constraint. The current period utility function is
additively separable in consumption, c, real balances,m1, and labor supply,
The restriction (p. 753) that v'(O) +isstrong enough to rule out
price solutions in which real balances approach zero; in essence, the
possession of real balances becomes so urgent whenm is small that agents
will hold an amount Em, bounded away from zero, even when the rate of
12/ money creation approaches infinity.— Aimed at preventing multiple price
solutions, Brock's condition implies money demand behavior for which all
money supply processes are process consistent since the price level cannot
beinfinite in finite time.
Rather than by placing money directly in the utility function, other
theoristshave sought to explain money demandby placing explicit payment
or saving technologies in models with explicitly optimizing agents. The
overlapping generations models, e.g. Samuelson (1958), Lucas (1972), Wallace
(1980), produce a demand for money because money serves to transfer consumption
from one period af life to another. These models do not rule out multiple
price solutions in which prices may rise to infinity.
Wallace does not consider this "tenuous-iss" of money to be a problem;
as in Lucas (1972) he is satisfied (p. 55) to assume away multiple solutions
by assuming that current prices are functions only of the current state of
the economy, where the current state does not include time. This turnsout-27—
to be a weaker requirement than is imposed by assuming some transversality
condition, since the assumption that the current prices is a function of
the state of the economy does not preclude process inconsistency.--"
However, other researchers, desiring to close off the possibility of
multiple solutions by explicit behavioral assumptions, have suggested the
use of transversality-type conditions in the overlapping generations model.
Scheinkman (1980) proposes to attach a transversality condition of a type
first used by Brock (1978) to overlapping generations models. If the
young person's utility function is u(c1, c2) =u(c1)+ u(c2), where c
is consumption in the ith period of life (Scheinkman's notation), then
lim xu'(x) >0
x-+O
is sufficient to produce a unique price solution (see Scheinkman, pp. 95 —96).
The reasoning here is that consumption is urgent enough at low levels that
the marginal utility of consumption approaches infinity at least at the
sane rate that x (or real balances) approaches zero. Scheinkman demonstrates
that this condition is equivalent to urn x >0,where p. is the rate of
p.
growth of money and real balances, x, are a function of the rate of money
growth; this prevents the price level from being infinite in finite time.
Brock and Scheinkrnan (1980, p.229) argue that any device which prevents
real balances from falling below some arbitrarily small >0excludes the
possibility of multiple solutions with the price level rising to infinity.
As alternatives to the transversality conditions, such devices may enter
through the introduction of some tax payable in money or through some payments
technology which cannot speed up sufficiently for available real balances-28-
to implement trade in all available real goods. The first argument is a
theme developed by Starr (1980, 1974), but it does not seem to hold in
a continuous—time model since money is a stock and taxes are flows.'1
(1980) model, an example of a transactions technology which sets
a floor on real balances, also depends on a fixed payments period. Since,
as Barro (1970) demonstrated, payments accelerate in a hyperinflation,
Lucas' model with an endogenous payments interval added to it would not
rule out multiple price paths in the absence of a transversality condition.
Also, Scheinkman (1980) shows that adding some auxiliary barter capacity
to Lucas' model reestablishes the possibility of multiple soultions. It
seems that these e >0conditions are merely step-children of the
transverality assumptions. In any case, to assume > 0 for any rate of
money growth is to exclude the possibility of process inconsistency.
b) Process Inconsistency vs. Transversality Conditions
Since the transversality conditions or 0 conditions imply that
no money supply process can be inconsistent, they also imply that computations
of process consistency probabilities should be related to the advent ofmonetary
reform only by coincidence. Since in all three cases of extreme hyperinflation
the probabilities of process consistency reach their lowest values at the
moment of the reform, one is tempted to conclude that more than a chance
association is involved and to allocate these results as the first entries
in the "empirical evidence against" column of the scoresheets for optimizing
monetary theories.
That such a conclusion is premature lies in our neglect of the political
mechanism that forces a reform. In our (1980a) model of monetary reform we
postulated an "amorphous political mechanism" which transforms a high
probability of process inconsistency into a rationally high subjective-29—
probability of reform. We interpreted the simultaneity of the
German reform with the lowest process consistency probability as evidence
in favor or our theory. However, we cannot count the result as evidence
against monetary theories which preclude process inconsistency unless we
can show that they predict a different result. To do this we must attach
to them some political mechanism which somehow forces a reform and determine
if the mechanism should force a reform at a different time from our
"amorphous mechanism".
The urgency of consumption and the inability to transact ot pay taxes
when real balances are low all suggest a political mechanism of reform which
is triggered into action when real balances fall to some critical level
because of the central bank's money creation process.It seems reasonable
to associate the timing of reform with the date at which real balances
reach their lowest levels. Indeed, in the Hungarian and Greek cases, reform
occurs just after the lowest level of real balances is attained,-' as reference to
Table VIII will indicate. Since, prior to the reform dates in these two
inflations, money grew at ever more rapid rates, our series of process
consistency probabilities should decline steadily and also reach its lowest
value on the reform date simply as a result of our computation method. Therefore,
the coincidence of the reform dates with the low points in our process
consistency probability series should not be a surprise, even though process
consistency has no operational meaning. We conclude that the data from the
Greek and Hungary II cases do not distinguish between these two theories of






only (million (million Real Balances
Date goldmark) goidmark) Date June 1941120
July 14, 1923 572.3 — Jan,1944 15.9
July 23 381.7 — Feb. 13.5
July 31 166.4 — March 10.6
August 7 79.3 — April 11.5
August 15 181.0 — May 8.27
August 23 226.4 — June 10.1
August 31 270.3 — July 5.36
Sept. 7 93.6 — August 5.03
Sept. 15 147.8 — Sept. 3.31
Sept. 22 329.3 338.7 Oct. 3.50
Sept. 29 740.7 751.8 Nov. 11 .33
Oct. 6 328.4 337.4 Dec. 2.21
Oct. 15 137.7 141.1 Jan. 1946 8.9
Oct. 23 39.3 47.6 Feb. 15.0
Oct. 31 144.6 300.3 March 20.0
Nov. 7 127.7 373.8 April 32.5
Nov. 15 154.7 458.7 May 28.3
Nov. 23 223.9 941.3 June 54.1
Nov. 30 400.2 1487.8 July 56.1
Dec. 7 390.0 1810.7 August 40.5
Dec. 15 414.2 1958.5
Dec. 22 474.6 2131.1
Dec. 31 496.5 2273.6
Source: Statistiches Reichsit, 1925 Source: Cleveland and Delivanis,
pp. 47—49. Statistical AppendicesTable VIII (continued)
Hungary 11*














*Source: Cagan (1956), p. 110, Table B9.—31—
The German case is somewhat different; for the money series with
Reichsbanknotes alone, real balances declined until October 23, 1923 and rose
substantially in November, 1923, the month of the reform. For the data
which includes all monies, the low point is again October with substantial
increases in real balances in November. Process consistency probabilities
reach the lowest point at the moment of the reform (for the data with all
monies). The simple reform mechanism based on levels of real balances
should have forced the reform a month prior to its actual occurrence. The
reform mechanism based on process consistency probabilities places the
reform at the correct moment (for one of the German money series). This
result seems to distinguish between the two hypotheses and to provide evidence
against the transversality -( > 0)conditions. However, the distinction
is weak since one can readily postulate a lag in the implementation of the
reform, which, though caused by the dearth of real balances in October, did
16/ not take effect until November.——32—
III. Conclusion
In this study we have applied our technique for measuring process
consistency probabilities to all the hyperinflationary episodesexamined by
Cagan. As in our previous work, we find that for the severehyperinflations
the process consistency probabilities attain their lowest values atthe times
of the monetary reforms; however, the phenomena observed at theends of
these inflations easily can be interpreted as evidence which supports monetary
theories whose assumptions preclude any operational meaning for process
inconsistency. Only in the German case do the data distinguishbetween
these two types of theories. For obvious reasons, we lean toward interpreting
the German result as evidence in favor of the possibility that process
inconsistency may materialize and against those monetary theoriesin which
transversality conditions or other similar devices excludethe possibility.
Even the Germanevidence seems. weak, so weare wary of making too strong a
caseforits powers of distinction. However, since it appears to usthat
there exist no other means of empirically confronting this arrayof
constraints attached to optimizing models of money, we present ourresults,
because it is possible that they may alter some priors, though we arenot
sure of the direction of change.—33—
Appendix
In this appendix we describe the method which we used to integrate
numerically the p.d.f. in (3) over the region in (4). The function H(e, Z)
is bi-rnodal; one mode occurs in a region where e >1and one is in a
region where<1.The function has properties such that for given Z,
H(9, Z) =0and }I(e, Z) =0.For given c, H(8, Z) =0.
Along the Z-axis, for given ,thereis a single inflection point. In
the 0-directionfor < 1and given Z, there is a single inflection point;
similarly,for 8 >1and given Z, there is a single inflection point. The
function is diagrammed inFigure 4. Point A is an inflection point ofthe
ftnction for given 8; B is aninflection point for given Z; and C and D
are the two modal values.
Weintegrated this p.d.f. over 36 contiguous regions in the (e Z)
plane; the probability weights outside of those regions were never significant.
The regions were determined as follows. The 0-axis between .6 and 1.3 was
divided intoeLve senents, six on either side of 0—axis between .6 and 1.3 was
on the 0-axis which define the division were .6 ,.7,.8,.9,. 95, 975, 1.00,
1.01, 1.03, 1.05, 1.075, 1.15, and 1.3. For a given segment of the 0-axis,
the Z-axis was divided into three segments. The position of these segments
depended on the average over the e-segment of the p.d.f.'s Z-direction
inflection points. For instance, the first e segment, between .6 and .7,
was subdivided into 25 subsegments for the numerical integration; for the
endpoint of each subsegment there is a value of Z which locates the
-
inflectionpoint of the p.d.f. Define Z* as the average of these Vs across
thegivenesegment.Then for the esegmentbetween .6 and .7 the Z-axis






Z* >logj,,thenthe segments were zero to log ,log'jjtoZ*, and Z* to .5.
The regions of integration for a given observation in a given
hyperinflation might then appear as in Figure 5.Region1isthe rectangle
definedby [.6< e ￿.7,0< Z￿ ZU, where Z is the average of the
inflection points for the .6 <8<.7segment. Region 2 is the rectangle
[.6￿ e￿.7,Z￿ Z log ]; Region 3 is the rectangle [.6< 8￿ .7, log Z .5];
region 4 is the rectangle [.7 ￿ e ￿.8,0Z Z], etc. For purposes
of the numerical integration, each rectangle, except the two rectangles
containing the modal values of (9, Z), was subdivided by splitting its
sides into 25 subsegments; thus, the p.d.f. was evaluated at 625 points in
each region. The sides of the modal rectangles were dividedinto 50subsegments,
so in these two regions the p.d.f. was evaluated at 2500 points.
We took this care in setting our regions and grid sizes because of
the nature of the p.d.f. Typically, H(, Z) produced a very narrow ridge
running in the edirection;the probability weight was so concentrated, that
it was easy to miss significant portions of it by making the mesh of our
grids too Large. Using the inflection points of the p.d.f. assured that we
would catch most of the probability weight. The same reasoning lay behind
our selecting a finer mesh in the modal regions.
To carry out the integration, we used SimpsOn'S rule twice. See
Zelirier (1971, Appendix C) for a description of this method.r.j'f.,
—36—
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Notes
1/ Less emphasis has been given to the role of hyperinflation as part of
the continuous economic process, producing effects which may still manifest
themselves long after the monetary reform.
2/ En addition, our model is capable of removing the discontinuity between
an extreme hyperinflation and its post-reform era.
3/ Some of our previous work involving the German case has been criticized
on the grouxLd.s that hyperinflation data contains massive measurement errors.
We find this critique hard to take seriously. A relevant measure_.
of the importance of measurement error in data might be the ratio of variance
induced by measurement error to total variance. A measure of unity would
indicate worthless data. Because total variance in the data is so astoundingly
huge, we feel, as did Cagan (1956, pp. 47-51), that measurement error is not
a serious problem.
4/ Weassumed that no cuxrent information is used by agents forming
inflation expectationsbecause we wanted a simple method to capture agents'
inability to observe current money currently. A more complex alternative
would involve agents observing prices currently and forming an estimate of
current money from that price information. The imposition of this additional
complication is not pursued. If we did pursue this complication our
results would be a weighted average of our present results and the results
assuming agents to have full current information about money and prices.
The full current information results maybeobtained from those presented
belowby pushing all of our probabilities back in time one observation
interval.
5/ Cagansuggestedthatthis phenomenon may have been due to agents' anticipation
of monetary reform. If this suggestion is correct, then agents in the
extremeinflations must have had a reason to believe inimpending reform
whileagents in the mild inflations had no such reason.
The need to exclude the last two months of the Polish data as outliers
may have arisen in empirical technique; Barro (1970) managed to
incorporate the entire Polish data set in estimating his model.
6/ The Reichsbanknotes were the currency which drove the hyperinflation.
While other currencies constituted a third of the money supply in 1918, they
remained relatively stable during the following years, so that by the end
of 1922 they represented only 1.5 percent of the money stock.
7/Cagan felt that the "fixed value" currencies should be left out of the —-
moneytotals since they were not depreciating in terms of goods. -However,
these currencies had no backing; they were promises to pay in soma asset
ienominated in gold which would be available at some point in the future.—38—
8/ One reason that this change may have occurred is that use of a weekly
series quadruples the number of pre-1923 observations from 50 to 200; any
given 1923 observation would then produce less of an alteration in the
posterior p.d.f. However, beginning in August the observations on
deviated substantially enough from the predictable values that the posterior
p.d.f.'s (at least in terms of the probabilities associated with the
convergent regions) were essentially the same.
9/ Bomberger and Makinen (1980) have recently reiterated Nogaro's observations
in a more modern idiom.
10/ The Russian invasion of Hungary occurred in the early months of 1945,
so this is a reasonable time to start with diffuse priors. Before 1945,
there was a substantial money creation, but with the Russian invasion
Hungarian Nazis ran off with the currency reserves, so there was little
money creation before June, 1945.
11/ There was an attempt to reform the currency in early 1922 by replacing
the old ruble with a new ruble. Table 1 indicates the degree of success
ofthis reform.
12/For details of this result the discussion of Figures 2.1 and 3.1 in
Brock (1974), p. 756 and p. 759, is helpful. Brock requires still stronger
restrictions on v(m )topreclude price solutions in which the nominal price
of goods converges o zero, but this need not concern us here.
13/ This is true provided that the equilibrium price function is selected
from the proper domain. Lucas (1972) restricts the domain so that the price
solutioncannot be infinite in finite time in order to fit the assumptions of
the Banach fix-point theorem required in his existence proof. He shows that
afinite solution will always exist regardless of the anticipated growth rate
of money. In the context of Lucas' model, in which money is transferred to
agents according to their money holdings, the transfer offsets any anticipated
depreciation in real value due to inflationary money creation. Process
inconsistency cannot arise as an issue in such a case. In a model in which
money is transferred randomly to agents, process inconsistency may be possible.
In that case, restricting the price solution to a domain which bounds real
balances away from zero may lead to a unique solution which makes no economic
sense.
14/ Assuming that real balances never fall belowimplies that the government
can extract arbitrarily large amounts of real resources by increasing the rate
of money creation; at some point, the government will be unable to extract
the direct taxregardless of the enforcement measures it may take .1?ecause it
will already be extracting most income and wealth indirectly through this
inflation tax.
The tax argument also does not seem to have much empirical relevance. For
instance in theGerman case,real taxes collapsed as inflation rates accelerated;
thus, the rise in prices seems to force the c of real taxes payable to the
government in cash to collapse toward zero. We reproduce here a table from
Bresciani—Turroni indicating the sequence of tax revenue during the German
hyperinflation.—39—
15/ Of course, we must ignore the large quantities of foreign currencies
which circulated as money in each of the severe hyperinflations. We have
also neglected the effects of this replacement of domestic by foreign
currency on theparameter in computing our process consistency probability
series; if a.wereactually larger than we assume, than the probability of
process inconsistency would also be larger.
16/ However, the revolutions and social unrest of November, 1923
-
thenbecome difficult to explain (see Flood and Garber (1980a), footnote).
The legal framework establishing the Rentenbank, the vehicle of reform,










































Source: Bresciani—Turroni, Appendix, Table I.—41--
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